In teaching courses on Karl Rahner to undergraduates, I have come to appreciate the importance of finding a starting point with which students readily connect. After much thought, I begin these courses with an extended consideration of the human person. This starting point has the advantage not only of being Rahner’s but also of being one which seems attractive to students. I have found little evidence that students have to be convinced about the importance of self-concern. I am careful to (...) emphasize, however, that in Rahner’s understanding of the dynamism of conversio and reditio this starting point never allows for any form of narcissistic subjectivism. Starting with the concreteness of our lives naturally leads to other considerations which also seem attractive to students: the burden of self-responsibility, the sense of awe and wonder, the need for hope. These are among some of the concerns which I try to address when teaching Rahner. (shrink)

A term and its contradictory exhaust the universe of discourse, but when examined for their relation to each other, I believe they are seen to exhaust that universe in a more particular respect than may have come into notice. They seem to exhaust or annul one of the leading notions of mathematical logic. This notion is the one concerning the whereabouts of the null class.

This paper brings Karl Rahner’s understanding of human ex-sistence (L. ex ‘out, forth’ and sistere ‘to stand’)—that is, human ‘standing forth’—to bear upon the phenomenon of black rage in the United States. The reason for this application is the emancipatory potential of Rahner’s transcendental realism, which basically understands human life as a dynamism at once rooted ‘in the world’ and yet called, in obediential potency, to the qualitative ‘more’. Rahner’s anthropological understanding allows for an investigation of the existential struc ture (...) and possibilities of black rage which may benefit black ex-sistence by showing how the dynamism of human life accounts for and justifies this rage as well as what liberating possibilities open up for the enraged. (shrink)

The creeds of religion, not being open to objective review and confirmation, are subjective only. they presume that the idea internally raises the object. this is the ontological argument extended. it remains internal, of no external import, and issues in solipsism.

1. Introduction. Nowadays metaphysics is so far out of fashion, with scientists at any rate, that a few words of justification may be required for putting it in relation with science, as in this paper.Metaphysics is nothing occult, nor is it necessarily dogmatic or allied to theology. Strictly, it is a science itself, the science of being. But since a large section of being—even the whole of it, according to some metaphysics—consists of phenomena, and since the ostensible business of natural (...) science is with phenomena, a distinction has to be made. The use of ‘metaphysics’ in this paper is restricted to the non-phenomenal mode of being. More explicitly, it is restricted to formal and general things, such as category, class, variable, relation, order. General words, which I take to be all the words except certain proper names, are, accordingly, metaphysical signs; and the metaphysical matrix is by no means limited to science but extends to all discourse in which there are general terms. (shrink)

Current attention directed at ethical dimensions of data and Artificial Intelligence have led to increasing recognition of the need to secure and maintain public support for uses of people’s data. This is essential to establish a “Social Licence” for current and future practices. The notion of a “Social Licence” recognises that there can be meaningful differences between what is legally permissible and what is socially acceptable. Establishing a Social Licence entails public engagement to build relationships of trust and ensure that (...) practices align with public values. While the concept of the Social Licence is well-established in other sectors – notably in relation to extractive industries – it has only very recently begun to be discussed in relation to digital innovation and data-intensive industries. This article therefore draws on existing literature relating to the Social Licence in extractive industries to explore the potential approaches needed to establish a Social Licence for emerging data-intensive industries. Additionally, it draws on well-established literature relating to trust to examine the relevance of trust, and trustworthiness, for emerging practices in data-intensive industries. In doing so the article considers the extent to which pursuing a Social Licence might complement regulation and inform codes of practice to place ethical and social considerations at the heart of industry practice. We focus on one key industry: Financial Technology. We demonstrate the importance of combining technical and social approaches to address ethical challenges in data-intensive innovation and to establish relationships of trust to underpin a Social Licence for Financial Technology. Such approaches are needed across all areas and industries of data-intensive innovation to complement regulation and inform the development of ethical codes of practice. This is important to underpin culture change and to move beyond rhetorical commitments to develop best practice putting ethics at the heart of innovation. (shrink)

Karl Marx’s acerbic observation in the opening lines of _The Eighteenth Brumaire_ that “all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” may be profitably applied to a reconsideration of literary farce sui generis, a genre represented in this article by a long-neglected work of utopian fiction, Archibald Marshall’s _Upsidonia_ (1915). Although _Upsidonia_’s current disregard is arguably undeserved, the article’s chief interest is not to reclaim the novel on (...) aesthetic grounds but to illuminate the mechanics of what Marx would call its “serious buffoonery.” In its persistent reversal of capitalist principles and relations, _Upsidonia_ naturally invites readers to revisit Marx, whose mordant gambit may serve as a key to Marshall’s own farcical plot and praxis, rooted in return and repetition, the essential maneuvers of farce itself. (shrink)